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It is perhaps appropriate if not unfortu-
nate in light of the Eurozone troubles that 
the origin of the word “crisis” is Greek. 
The economic – nay, human – toll of the 
euro crisis is enormous. For example, 
the unemployment rate in Greece, a very 
hard-hit country, rose from under 8 per-
cent in 2008 to over 27 percent by 2013; 
by April 2015 it still stood at more than 
25 percent.1 Since 2011, Greek youth 
unemployment (less than 25 years old) 
has typically been higher than 50 percent. 
Poverty levels and food insecurity are 
not only reaching epic levels, but many 
of Greece’s best and brightest are flock-
ing abroad.2
This issue of The Political Econo-
mist brings you three truly erudite per-
spectives by which to better understand 
the ongoing catastrophe (another word 
of Greek origin) that is the euro crisis. 
Jeffry Frieden analyzes the political and 
economic origins of this crisis, which he 
characterizes as a classic foreign debt 
crisis. He also offers perceptive lessons 
for moving forward. Barry Eichengreen 
compares the Great Depression of the 
1930s with the current crisis. He deftly 
describes both parallels and important 
differences between history and the pres-
ent. Last but certainly not least, Stefanie 
Walter puts forth a new framework – the 
vulnerability profile – to assess the like-
lihood and difficulty of implementing 
policy responses to balance-of-payments 
crises like the euro crisis.
1  The unemployment statistics are from Eu-
rostat. The negative effects of the euro crisis 
have been widespread throughout the Euro-
zone’s periphery. In Spain, unemployment 
in 2015 remains above 20 percent; it Italy, it 
remains above 12 percent.
2  Anemona Hartocollis, “Greece Financial 
Crisis Hits Poorest and Hungriest the Hard-
est.” New York Times, July 11, 2015. Helena 
Smith, “Young, Gifted, and Greek: Genera-
tion G – The World’s Biggest Brain Drain.” 
The Guardian, January 19, 2015.
We are incredibly grateful to our dis-
tinguished contributors, whom we now 
introduce. Jeffry Frieden is the Stanfield 
Professor of International Peace in the 
Department of Government at Harvard 
University. His contribution draws from 
his new book, Currency Politics: The Po-
litical Economy of Exchange Rate Policy, 
published by Princeton University Press 
(2015). Barry Eichengreen is the George 
C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor 
of Economics and Political Science at the 
University of California, Berkeley. He 
further develops the themes of his contri-
bution in his new book, Hall of Mirrors: 
The Great Depression, the Great Reces-
sion, and the Uses – and Misuses – of 
History, published by Oxford University 
Press (2015). Stefanie Walter is Professor 
of International Relations and Political 
Economy in the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Zurich. The 
paperback edition of her book, Financial 
Crises and the Politics of Macroeconom-
ic Adjustment, was recently published by 
Cambridge University Press (2015).
Sincerely,
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From the Chair
Newsletter editors Mark Dincecco and Bill 
Clark demonstrate once again how political 
economy uses history, theory, and method to 
tackle macroscopic questions of great politi-
cal urgency.  Pushing off from the politics of 
the 2008 financial crisis, the three contribu-
tions to this issue of The Political Economist 
– Jeff Frieden, Stephanie Walter, and Barry 
Eichengreen – compare financial crises and 
economic slumps across time and space. 
Between them, they offer explanations for 
cross-national similarity and divergence in 
cause and response that range from ideology 
(of central bankers, for example), to firm-
level and sectoral interests, to voter prefer-
ences, to cross-national variation in social 
vulnerabilities, to the relative power of 
states in the international system.  All three 
authors embed cross-national case studies in 
analyses of institutions and political currents 
at both international and national levels. 
Parsing these factors to identify patterns, 
identify causal mechanisms, and arbitrate 
theoretical debates is what keeps political 
economists in business.
In the 2000s, most scholars of Africa 
and Latin America moved away from study 
of the “politics of adjustment” and resigned 
to the imposed realities of neoliberalism 
(“there is no alternative!”). In African stud-
ies, the order of the day is studying policy 
implementation and performance, especially 
at the micro-level of local infrastructure and 
social service delivery, perfectly consistent 
with the World Bank agenda of building 
more efficient states and USAID’s focus 
on individual politicians’ accountability 
to voters. There is a striking contrast with 
the dramatic “scaling up” of much of the 
political economy work on Europe to a 
macroscopic focus on the interactions of fis-
cal, monetary, and social policy.  Partly this 
reflects the harsh reality of cross-regional 
and cross-national variation in the economic 
sovereignty of states, a fact underscored 
even within Europe by Greece’s highly 
constrained predicament. Partly the contrast 
in analytic focus between studies of African 
and European countries is data-driven (rich 
data opens many analytic possibilities). Yet 
the difference also points to the question of 
scholarly scope and vision that all political 
scientists confront. The contributors to this 
issue of The Political Economist embrace 
the challenge of scope and ambition in bold 
and inspiring ways. They identify and lever-
age cross-national variation, and propose 
analytic strategies that embed micro- and 
national-level political economy in a dy-
namic international context.
APSA 2015 was a very good meeting 
for the PE section.  Program Chair Nahomi 
Ichino organized almost 25 panels, round-
tables, and the poster session. Many thanks 
for this service. An impressive list of awards 
was presented at the business meeting -- see 
the back pages of this newsletter. (Please 
remember to nominate the best papers you 
heard for the Fiona McGillivray Award for 
best PE paper presented at APSA 2015.) 
Three new members joined the Execu-
tive Committee: Rachel Wellhausen (UT 
Austin), Leonardo Arriola (UC Berkeley), 
and Jonathan Rodden (Stanford), and we 
thanked the outgoing EC members. The 
business meeting was followed by beers at 
a local pub.
A highlight of the business meeting 
was Mark Dincecco’s presentation on the 
section newsletter, and the warm round of 
acclaim and thanks he and co-editor Bill 
Clark received for the consistently high 
quality and stimulating content of The 
Political Economist under their editorship. 
Four generations of newsletter editors were 
present to pile on the accolades and to at-
test to the joys and rewards of serving the 
section, APSA, and social science in this 
capacity.  Many present commented that 
they read the newsletter for new ideas and 
use it in graduate teaching.   
In October 2015, the search for a new 
newsletter editor or editorial team will open. 
A call for proposals/expressions of interest 
in editing the section newsletter by will go 
out in October.  Please watch for this an-
nouncement and consider putting in a bid. 
Section Secretary-Treasurer Bill Bernhard 
will head the search. The new editors will be 
named in Spring 2016 and their first news-
letter should come out in early 2017.
Our Program Chairs for APSA 2016 
are Sarah Brooks (Ohio State) and Alberto 
Simpser (ITAM). Please look for their Call 
for Papers for APSA 2016.
All best, 
Catherine Boone
c.boone@lse.ac.uk
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Political and Economic Origins of the Crisis in the Eurozone
The ongoing crisis in the Eurozone is 
a classic foreign debt crisis. As capital 
flowed into countries on the Eurozone 
periphery, the economies of the debtor 
nations expanded, then boomed, then 
bubbled – especially in asset and real 
estate markets – before crashing. After 
the collapse, the crisis grew, like all for-
eign debt crises, into a battle over who 
would bear the burden of adjusting to the 
accumulated debts.1 
To be sure, there are unusual fea-
tures of the Eurozone crisis, associated 
both with the common currency and with 
common membership in the European 
Union. But the central analytical real-
ity of the crisis is that it is remarkably 
similar, in many respects, to the hundreds 
of debt crises the world has known in 
recent decades.
The first few years of the euro were 
relatively serene, but once the Great 
Recession began in 2007, conditions 
became much more difficult. This was 
not surprising, both due to the mas-
sive capital flows that had taken place 
between 1999 and 2007, and because of 
features of the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). At the time of the intro-
duction of the euro, it was clear to most 
observers that there were at least three 
important issues that had not yet been 
resolved. All three contributed to the 
crisis as it unfolded.
The first problem that EMU, like any 
currency union, faced was the underlying 
differences in macroeconomic conditions 
among the member states. At the time 
of the introduction of the euro in 1999, 
there was a clear divergence between 
the relatively slow-growing Northern 
European countries and the more rapidly 
growing Southern European economies. 
Germany and Spain are exemplary: the 
1  This essay is adapted from chapter 4 of my 
Currency Politics: The Political Economy of 
Exchange Rate Policy (Princeton University 
Press, 2015).
Jeff Frieden, Harvard University
German economy was stagnant while 
Spain’s was growing quite rapidly. This 
difference was reflected in different rates 
of inflation: between 1998 and 2007, 
German inflation averaged just 1.5% a 
year, while in Spain it averaged 3.2%. 
This may seem a small difference, but 
compounded over nearly a decade, it led 
to a substantial divergence in wages and 
prices. Indeed,  between 1998 and 2007, 
unit labor costs in Germany actually fell 
by 3.9% while in Spain they rose by 
30.4%.2 Trends were similar for the other 
peripheral Eurozone countries – Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, and Portugal.
For most of this period, the ECB’s 
main interest rate was around 3%. This 
meant that real interest rates in Germany 
were almost 2%, while they were slightly 
negative in Spain. More generally, given 
the difference in price and income trends 
in the two countries, it made it extremely 
attractive for Spaniards to borrow. Mean-
while, Germany’s traditionally high 
savings rate was being raised further as 
its population aged and trade surpluses 
built up. The result was a massive flow 
of funds from Northern Europe to the 
Eurozone periphery. As capital flowed 
from the surplus countries of Northern 
Europe to the deficit countries of the 
Eurozone periphery, it reinforced the 
macroeconomic divergence. The debt-
financed consumption boom raised 
wages and prices, and increased the dif-
ference between the two regions. So the 
attempt to devise a common monetary 
policy for very different regions of the 
Eurozone led to a very imbalanced pat-
tern of capital flows, and growth.
This was reflected in the current 
accounts of the Northern and peripheral 
European countries – the lenders and 
the borrowers. In 1998, both Spain and 
Germany had small current account defi-
cits of about one percent of GDP; Italy 
and Ireland were running surpluses. By 
2  Data from Eurostat.  
2008, Germany’s current account was in 
surplus to the tune of 6 percent of GDP 
while Spain, Ireland, and Italy had defi-
cits of 10, 6, and 3 percent respectively; 
simply put, Germany’s surplus was go-
ing to finance the Eurozone periphery’s 
deficits.
Contrary to popular impressions, 
the vast majority of these loans went 
to private borrowers. Greece and, to a 
lesser extent, Portugal, were the only 
peripheral countries whose governments 
ran major budget deficits in this period. 
Spain’s enormous deficits went almost 
entirely to the private financial sector 
to be on-lent to the country’s booming 
housing market.
The second major problem was that 
the creation of the Eurozone led quickly 
to an integrated Eurozone-wide financial 
market, while bank regulation remained 
decentralized in the hands of national au-
thorities. This allowed banks to take ad-
vantage of regulatory differences to seek 
out higher-yield, and higher-risk, loans; 
and also created great uncertainty as to 
who would ultimately be responsible for 
banking problems that might arise.
A third problem was that many 
market participants anticipated that if 
financial difficulties did arise in one of 
the Eurozone member states, the other 
member states would be forced to bail it 
out. This expectation was widespread, 
despite attempts by Eurozone and nation-
al authorities to insist that there would 
be no bailout. International and regional 
experience told market operators other-
wise: a major financial meltdown in one 
country could threaten the entire Euro-
zone, and would force other countries to 
step in. Expectations of a bailout meant 
that market participants did not have to 
worry about the risks associated with 
weaknesses in an individual country’s 
finances. These expectations led spreads 
on sovereign borrowing by all Eurozone 
Frieden Feature Essay...continued from page 3
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countries to decline precipitously when 
the euro was introduced. For almost ten 
years every government of the Eurozone 
could borrow at interest rates roughly 
equal to those charged to Germany. This, 
of course, encouraged sovereign borrow-
ing in the Eurozone periphery. Not all 
countries took advantage of this – Spain 
and Ireland, for example, did very little 
public borrowing – but some, led by 
Greece, did.
In the event, these three problems 
came together to bring the Eurozone 
close to collapse. The massive capital 
flows from the North to the periphery 
led to a boom, then a bubble, in the pe-
riphery. As the 2007-2008 crisis broke, 
this bubble also burst. Financial institu-
tions throughout the Eurozone turned 
out to be holding trillions of euros worth 
of questionable assets. This was true 
of investors in the creditor (Northern) 
countries, and of financial institutions 
in the debtor (peripheral) countries, as 
much of the lending was intermediated 
through local banks. Peripheral govern-
ments found themselves compelled to 
bail out their illiquid or insolvent banks, 
at extraordinary expense.
The result was a Eurozone debt cri-
sis, in which peripheral countries owed 
debts they could not service to Northern 
European creditors. There are many 
fascinating aspects of the crisis, all of 
them worthy of analysis, but for now I 
conclude with three points of potentially 
general interest:
1. In today’s financially integrated world, 
foreign debt crises are no longer the ex-
clusive province of developing countries 
and emerging markets. And foreign debt 
crises in advanced industrial countries 
look very similar to those in poor coun-
tries. In particular, the aftermath of such 
crises are just as likely to degenerate into 
bitter battles over the distribution of the 
adjustment burden.3 Indeed, the Eurozone 
conflict over this topic is one of the more 
bitter on record.
2. Currency policies have a powerful 
impact on debt dynamics.4 Currency and 
3  For one approach see my “The Political 
Economy of Adjustment and Rebalancing,” 
Journal of International Money and Finance, 
52 (January 2015): 4-14. 
4  For a quick blogpost on this see my “Cur-
rency politics, debt politics” on Econbrowser. 
debt crises are often closely linked, and 
the political economy of both currency 
policy and foreign debt are similarly 
closely related (Stefanie Walter’s con-
tribution to this newsletter makes this 
point clearly).
3. Economic and Monetary Union has 
many attractions – recall that seven na-
tions have adopted the euro since 2001, 
six since the crisis began.5 However, the 
restrictions that a fixed exchange rate or 
common currency impose on national 
policymakers are serious and can be 
extremely costly. 
The Eurozone crisis is a terrible 
reminder of how deep and long-lasting 
the potential economic and political ef-
fects of national monetary and financial 
policies can be. This makes it all the 
more important for scholars to try to 
understand why governments pursue the 
policies that they do – and, if possible, 
to help contribute to a better-informed 
public discussion of the choices available 
to national governments.
5  Again, for a quick blogpost on this topic 
see my “Currency politics: Understanding 
the euro” on Econbrowser. 
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Barry Eichengreen, University of California, Berkeley  
Déjà vu All Over Again
Feature Essay
Fall 2015 5
For aficionados of European economic 
and political history, it feels like the 
1930s all over again.  European govern-
ments entered the ‘Thirties with heavy 
debts severely limiting their fiscal room 
for maneuver.  Their central banks were 
tethered to a rigid if brittle international 
gold standard that severely restricted 
their capacity to counter deflation and 
act as lenders of last resort.  When the 
continent was then sideswiped by an 
economic and financial crisis originat-
ing in the United States, the result was 
collapsing money supplies, collapsing 
prices, collapsing banks, and collaps-
ing economic activity – in a phrase, the 
great macroeconomic catastrophe of the 
20th century.1
 As unemployment rose into the 
double digits, popular support for incum-
bent governments withered.  Confidence 
in the monetary status quo and in policies 
of fiscal consolidation intended to sustain 
it were early casualties of these develop-
ments.  One after another, starting in the 
summer 1931, central banks experienced 
runs on their reserves.  One after another, 
they responded by restricting withdraw-
als of bank deposits, imposing capital 
controls, and abandoning the gold stan-
dard.  Currencies depreciated, payments 
on foreign debts were suspended, and 
domestic debts were forcibly converted 
into new securities bearing lower rates of 
interest.   Having regained their monetary 
autonomy, central banks were able to cut 
interest rates and take other steps to con-
tain deflation.  Governments were able to 
take modest fiscal initiatives to support 
economic stabilization and recovery or 
at least to avoid compounding their dif-
ficulties with further spending cuts.
Economic recovery of a sort eventu-
1  The themes of this column are developed 
further in his book Hall of Mirrors: The 
Great Depression, the Great Recession, and 
the Uses – and Misuses – of  History (Ox-
ford University Press, 2015). 
ally followed, but the political conse-
quences were not pretty.  Where gov-
ernments resorted to these expedients, 
they were roundly criticized for having 
abandoned previous commitments. 
Where instead they stayed the course, 
they met a groundswell of opposition, 
in the polls and the streets, for their 
failure to effectively address the crisis. 
Established political parties lost sup-
port to new parties, of the extreme left 
and right, critical not just of prevailing 
policies but also of the prevailing politi-
cal system.  Center-left and center-right 
governments fell and were succeeded by 
new governments led by extremist par-
ties.  The resulting polarization had dire 
consequences for European solidarity, 
such as it was, and in some cases for 
electoral democracy itself. 
The parallels with the euro crisis are 
direct.  There is the impact on Europe 
of the Subprime Crisis emanating from 
the United States.  There is the rigid 
and brittle euro system limiting, or even 
eliminating, all scope for a stabilizing 
monetary response at the national level. 
There is the deflationary impact of the 
wage cuts and fiscal consolidation im-
posed in the interest of preserving the 
prevailing monetary regime.   There is 
the social distress associated with high 
levels of unemployment, in some cases 
exceeding 20 per cent.  There is the pre-
dictable political reaction, from rising 
support in national and regional elections 
for anti-establishment parties of the left, 
such as Syriza in Greece and Podemos in 
Spain, and of the right, such as the Na-
tional Front in France, to lack of effective 
opposition to governments, like that of 
Viktor Orbán in Hungary, that, invoking 
extenuating circumstances, play fast and 
loose with political freedoms and with 
the established division of powers.   At 
the European level, there is the erosion 
of trust and collapse of effective interna-
tional cooperation.
It is therefore tempting to infer that 
the euro crisis will end badly.  The euro 
is doomed; ultimately governments will 
abandon it as a necessary precondition 
for regaining their policy autonomy. 
The longer they wait, the more corrosive 
will be the effects of the ongoing slump, 
not just on the growth potential of their 
economies but on the stability and cohe-
sion of their political systems.
This earlier history thus provides a 
framework for thinking about the nature 
of the euro crisis and how it might ulti-
mately play out.  But differences between 
the 1930s and the current crisis also point 
to reasons why the current situation may 
play out differently.  The interwar gold 
standard was destabilized by the highly 
deflationary policies of the central bank 
at the center of the system, the U.S. 
Federal Reserve.  (Some recent accounts 
would emphasize the deflationary poli-
cies of the two leading central banks at 
the center of the interwar system, the 
Fed and the Bank of France, but no mat-
ter.)  At one point in time the European 
Central Bank could be accused of act-
ing likewise – recall its extraordinary 
decision in 2011 to raise interest rates 
in the teeth of Europe’s slump, not once 
but twice – leaving countries seeking 
to counter deflation no alternative but 
to contemplate exiting the euro area. 
But the ECB learned from its mistakes 
and, arguably, from the critique from 
commentators and scholars that it was 
repeating the errors of central banks in 
the 1930s.   In January 2015 it acknowl-
edged deflation as Public Enemy No. 1 
and announced an ambitious program 
of quantitative easing.  In contrast to the 
situation facing members of the interwar 
gold standard, for members of the euro 
area there is at least hope of some light at 
the end of the deflationary tunnel.
In addition, in 1931 and subsequent 
years, interwar trade and finance had 
already collapsed.  In 1930 the United 
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States imposed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, 
and one country after another retaliated 
with increased tariff barriers of their own. 
Governments in Central Europe and else-
where supplemented tariffs with import 
quotas and other quantitative controls. 
Similarly, by 1931 international capital 
flows had already collapsed.  Overseas 
lending peaked in mid-1928 and headed 
sharply down; after a brief recovery in 
1930, it collapsed permanently in 1931. 
The argument that the gold standard 
needed to be preserved in the interest 
of maintaining free international trade 
and financial transactions, while widely 
invoked, thereby lost its weight.  
Today, in contrast, the European 
Union still has its Single Market to 
preserve.  There may have been some 
decline in cross-border holdings of 
sovereign debt and cross-border bank 
lending within the euro area, but any 
such “renationalization of finance” is 
mild by the standards of the 1930s. 
European rules also prevent member 
states from significantly interfering with 
cross-border flows of goods and services. 
But whether the Single Market – and for 
that matter the EU itself – would survive 
the collapse of the euro area is, to put it 
mildly, uncertain.
Third, say what you will about 
lack of trust and the decline of political 
solidarity resulting from the euro crisis, 
political tensions within Europe, whether 
between Berlin and other national capi-
tals or more generally, these are still mild 
by the standards of the  1930s.  In 1931 
France and Germany were just 12 years 
removed from four years of devastating 
trench warfare.  There was nothing re-
motely resembling the institutions of the 
European Union with its procedures and 
conventions for organizing cooperation. 
International loans designed to support 
governments with embattled currencies 
and banking systems starting in 2010 
might desirably have been larger and 
subject to less onerous conditional-
ity, but they have been nothing if not 
generous by the standards of the 1930s 
Finally, all the weaknesses of pres-
ent-day European political systems 
notwithstanding, national political in-
stitutions are more durable than in the 
1930s.  In 1930 some European coun-
tries had accumulated barely a decade 
of practical experience with democracy. 
In others democratic traditions had 
longer histories, but experience with an 
extensive electoral franchise and modern 
party system was still limited, if not to 
one decade, then to no more than several. 
Democratic institutions and traditions 
today have longer histories, are more 
deeply embedded, and are therefore, 
arguably, more durable.
History, Mark Twain is alleged to 
have said, doesn’t repeat itself, but it 
does rhyme.  We shall see.
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The euro crisis has turned into one of 
the most serious challenges that the 
European Union (EU) has had to face 
so far. At its root the crisis is a balance-
of-payments crisis; caused by divergent 
economic developments among member 
states in the pre-crisis years and the deep 
financial integration that accompanied 
this process, as Jeffry Frieden points out 
in this newsletter. 
Balance-of-payments crises share 
the same core problem: a country invests 
more than it is saves, consumes more 
than it produces and imports more than 
it exports, all of which is reflected in a 
current account deficit. When the foreign 
capital that finances these imbalances 
dries up, crisis looms. 
In the past, the typical crisis re-
sponse of affected countries has been to 
devalue the exchange rate, a strategy also 
known as external adjustment. A second 
possible adjustment strategy is internal 
adjustment, in which relative prices are 
adjusted through austerity and struc-
tural reforms. Importantly, adjustment 
can also be achieved by implementing 
reforms in countries with current ac-
count surpluses. In these cases, external 
adjustment conversely implies an ap-
preciation of the exchange rate, whereas 
internal adjustment requires stimulating 
domestic demand and allowing higher 
inflation rates. 
Adjustment is usually associated with 
economic costs and therefore politi-
Figure 1: Vulnerability Profiles in Deficit and Surplus Countries
cally costly as well. Policymakers thus 
frequently resort to a third option: financ-
ing the current account deficit. Possible 
sources for such funds include capital 
officially provided by international 
organizations such as the IMF or other 
governments, but also less visible trans-
fers such as those recorded in EMU’s 
Target2 balances. The problem with this 
strategy is that financing does not resolve 
the underlying causes of imbalances. 
Which policy response a country 
chooses and how difficult it is to imple-
ment this response depends on the coun-
try’s “vulnerability profile,” as depicted 
in Figure 1 (for a more detailed discus-
sion see Walter 2013). If one adjustment 
path clearly imposes more costs than the 
'15THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST
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alternative, the government pursues the 
latter path swiftly and without major po-
litical difficulties (vulnerability profiles 
I and III). 
In contrast, when both crisis strate-
gies are associated with high economic 
and social costs (profile II), crisis politics 
will be fraught with political conflict, 
delay, and attempts to involve other 
countries in the crisis resolution process 
through financing. For countries with this 
vulnerability profile, distributive conflict 
is a defining feature of the resolution of 
balance-of-payments crises. Conflict 
takes place both within countries – re-
garding how the cost of adjustment is to 
be distributed among different societal 
groups – as well as between them  – 
concerning the question of which state 
should bear the costs of adjustment. 
The fact that the Eurozone is a mon-
etary union make the politics of respond-
ing to the euro crisis unique in two key 
respects, however. 
First, the costs of external adjust-
ment are exceptionally high for Eurozone 
members. Because external adjustment 
would imply Eurozone exit and possibly 
the loss of EU membership, such a step is 
likely to cause financial havoc and a huge 
economic and political fallout for both the 
exiting country and the European Union 
as a whole. Whereas this is less prob-
lematic for countries such as Ireland, for 
which internal adjustment is feasible, it 
places countries such as Greece, Portugal, 
and Spain into the unfortunate vulner-
ability profile II. These are examples of 
deficit countries where macroeconomic 
austerity and structural reforms are dif-
ficult to implement. But surplus countries 
also find themselves in this profile. For 
example, its high inflation aversion but 
equally high vulnerability to a breakup 
of the Eurozone places Germany in this 
category as well. In fact, most Eurozone 
countries fit vulnerability profile II.
This analysis paints a rather depress-
ing picture, because it suggests that EMU 
policymakers should have a difficult time 
in implementing a decisive crisis resolu-
tion strategy. The painful and drawn-out 
reform process, the convoluted and con-
troversial politics of the euro crisis, and 
the strong reliance on external financing 
in the form of bailouts, the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and grow-
ing Target2 balances all attest to these 
difficulties. Domestically, incumbents 
in profile II deficit countries have been 
punished electorally; support for radical 
parties has increased and protest politics 
has become more prevalent in the wake 
of the crisis. 
A second unique feature of the euro 
crisis concerns the bargaining power of 
deficit and surplus countries. It is usu-
ally difficult for deficit countries to shift 
the burden of adjustment onto surplus 
countries, and the euro crisis has been 
no exception in this regard. EMU surplus 
countries such as Germany have proven 
to be rather reluctant to accept higher 
rates of inflation or to actively stimulate 
domestic demand, although the ECB’s 
recent loose monetary policy can be in-
terpreted as a small step in this direction. 
At the same time, significant financial 
inter-linkages within the monetary union 
mean that the costs of a further escalation 
of the crisis or even a break-up of the 
Eurozone would be huge for deficit and 
surplus countries alike. This substantially 
increases the bargaining power of deficit 
countries vis-à-vis surplus countries. 
Surplus countries that wish to avoid 
internal adjustment at home may there-
fore be more willing to contribute to a 
financing of current account deficits in 
peripheral countries through intra-EMU 
or intra-EU transfers, possibly even 
permanently. The discussions about fis-
cal union, an EU-wide unemployment 
benefits scheme, or “intra-EU solidarity” 
more generally attest to this possibility 
and it is likely that these discussions will 
intensify if the crisis persists. Given that 
this is quite unpopular among many Eu-
ropeans, however, such financing carries 
the risk of fueling already growing Euro-
sceptic sentiments within member states. 
Taken together then, this suggests that the 
resolution of the eurozone’s problems 
will continue to be a drawn-out, painful, 
and politically costly process.
Reference
Walter, Stefanie (2013). Financial Crises and 
the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustment. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Section Awards: Citations
Fiona McGillivray Award 
(given for the best paper in political economy presented at the previous year's APSA annual meeting)
The award is shared by: 
“Assessing the ‘Threat’ of International Tension to the U.S. Economy,” Eugene Gholz (University of Texas at Austin) 
“Agents of the Regime? Traditional Leaders and Electoral Clientelism in South Africa,” Daniel de Kadt (MIT) and Horacio A. 
Larreguy (Harvard University)
In addition to highlighting the power and diversity of different political economy methods, this year’s prize winners also ranged 
widely in their choice of topics—another hallmark of our field.  
U.S. grand strategy was the focus of our first prize-winning paper, “Assessing the ‘Threat’ of International Tension to the U.S. 
Economy,” by Eugene Gholz.  Gholz’s target is the familiar claim that America’s military leadership greases the wheels of global 
commerce.  On the contrary, Gholz argues, global trade would continue apace even if the US were to abdicate its leadership 
responsibilities and let regional conflicts fester.  Using historical examples and reasoning by analogy, Gholz makes a compelling 
case.  Well-argued, punchy, and provocative, his paper is a real boom for the reader.  
The second award-winning paper is  “Agents of the Regime? Traditional Leaders and Electoral Clientelism in South Africa,” by 
Daniel de Kadt and Horacio Larreguy.  What precisely do the governments of developing democracies gain by granting traditional 
leaders a degree of sub-national territorial autonomy?  Drawing on the Apartheid-era Bantustans of South Africa, they analysis 
quantifies the political payoff—percentage-point increase in vote-shares—derived by the African National Congress as a result 
of their entering into a deal with the region’s traditional chiefs.  Making effective use of a geographic regression discontinuity 
design, their analysis is a paragon of clarity.  It generates rich policy and substantive findings.
The selection committee would like to extend its warmest congratulations to the co-recipients of this year’s Fiona McGillivray 
prize.
Committee: Lloyd Gruber (London School of Economics), Alexandra Guisinger (University of Notre Dame), and Milan Svolik 
(University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)
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Mancur Olson Award 
(given for the best dissertation in political economy completed in the previous two years)
William H. Riker Award 
(given for the best book on political economy published during the past three calendar years)
Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach (Cambridge, 2014), Ben Ansell (University of Oxford) and 
David Samuels (University of Minnesota)
Ben Ansell and David Samuels’ 2014 book, Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach, takes on one of 
the biggest questions in political economy:  the relationship between inequality and democratization.
Ansell and Samuels manage to develop a novel and persuasive approach to this question.  They argue against those who see 
inequality as an impediment to democratization, noting a large number of cases in which highly unequal societies, as for example 
in Latin America, underwent democratization.  Formalizing those liberal insights from Locke and others, Ansell and Samuels 
argue that the root cause of democratization is the bourgeosie’s fear that the governing elite will expropriate their assets. Democ-
ratization is thus a mechanism for protecting the assets of the middle and working classes; inequality is a precondition.  
Ansell and Samuels present extensive, rigorous data for their model, testing the crucial links in their causal mechanism. This is 
a groundbreaking study that reorients our understanding of democratization by rethinking the role of inequality.
HONORABLE MENTION:
Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War (Cambridge, 2014), Jonathan Caverley (MIT)
HONORABLE MENTION:
The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and Influence (Cambridge, 2014), James Vreeland 
(Georgetown University) and Axel Dreher (Universität Heidelberg)
Committee: Lisa Martin (University of Wisconsin, Madison), Bonnie Meguid (University of Rochester), and Armando Razo 
(Indiana University, Bloomington)
THE POLITICAL ECONOMIST
“International Political Economy with Product Differentiation: Firm Level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization,” In Song Kim 
(MIT)
The aim of this dissertation, written at Princeton University, is to account for trade liberalization when protectionism seems 
politically optimal. The point of departure is that the within-industry variance of tariff rates in the United States is several times 
higher than the between-industry variance. The author finds that productive exporting firms are more likely to lobby individu-
ally to reduce tariffs (rather than industry-wide), and that countries liberalize industries particularly with partners whom they 
exchange differentiated products within industry. 
The research is based on a breathtaking amount of data collection: over 800,000 lobbying reports are analyzed to study the be-
havior of US firms, and 2 billion tariff-line data for 181 countries over 25 years are used to study patterns of reciprocal trade.  
The consequence of these results are profound and the empirical analysis sets a new bar for anyone who works on international 
trade.
Committee: Adam Przeworski (New York University), Irvin Lester Morris (University of Maryland), and Megumi Naoi (Uni-
versity of California, San Diego)
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Michael Wallerstein Award 
(given for the best published article in political economy in the previous calendar year)
“Was Weber Right? The Role of Urban Autonomy in Europe’s Rise,” American Political Science Review, 108/2 (May) 
2014: 337-354, David Stasavage (New York University)
David Stasavage addresses the long-standing debate over the role of cities in the development of European economies in 
the early modern period. He shows that politically autonomous cities grew faster than other areas in their early phases, 
but that eventually their growth slowed and fell behind that of other regions. 
Stasavage argues the commercial elites that dominated the cities originally established stable property rights that allowed 
the economy to flourish, but eventually imposed entry barriers that led the cities to stagnate. The article is a powerful 
contribution to an important debate. Its blend of rich theory and careful empirics makes it an outstanding example of the 
kind of work that deserves the Michael Wallerstein Award. 
Committee: Jeff Frieden (Harvard University), Giovanni Capoccia (University of Oxford), and Jeff Milyo (University of 
Missouri)
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Michael Wallerstein Endowment 
The Political Economy Section has received an endowment of an additional $3,000 from the Wallerstein family to add 
to the endowment of the Michael Wallerstein Award for the best published article in political economy in the previous 
calendar year. 
From the Wallerstein family: 
 
On the death of Robert Wallerstein, the father of Michael Wallerstein, he wanted to send an additional contribution to the 
Political Economy award in Michael’s name. As a pre-eminent psychoanalyst and academic, Robert Wallerstein valued 
both scholarship and education. He thought this kind of award represented the best of both aspects within his son’s field 
of Political Science. 
